A provider name — or even the same headline percentage — is not a comparable.
Public digital asset treasury filings now provide two kinds of controls. Hivemind, GSR and Galaxy show the same provider across materially different client mandates. Axe Compute / DNA goes further: the same provider held two different roles for the same issuer under separate adviser and asset-management agreements.
Cross-client controls
| Provider | Client / role | Recurring economics | Term / exit | Why the comparison matters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hivemind | AVAX One — discretionary asset manager | 1.25% per year of Account Size, quarterly in advance; later filing disclosed about $1.0M of first-half 2026 fees paid in full. | 10-year initial term; company cause-based termination mechanics. | Same 1.25% headline, different economics. AVAX One is a discretionary asset-management mandate tied to managed-account size. Upexi is a non-discretionary advisory mandate tied to issuer market capitalization and paid in shares. |
| Upexi — non-discretionary adviser | 0.3125% of issuer market capitalization per quarter, 1.25% annualized; paid quarterly in advance in Upexi shares, with 9.99% ownership cap and cash substitution. | 3-year initial term; no general company no-cause exit in the filed Section 2; cash-takeout mechanics can convert future share fees into remainder-of-term cash economics. | ||
| GSR | Lite Strategy — discretionary LTC manager | 1.75% per year of Account Assets; recurring fee paid in shares / pre-funded warrants; separate 1,461,989 GSR warrants. | 10-year exclusive term; company ordinary exit after first anniversary is tied to ending the LTC strategy and carries a present-value remaining-term formula. | Same 1.75% AUM rate, different payment and exit architecture. Lite Strategy uses equity-settled recurring fees and a 10-year exclusive mandate; Upexi's former GSR agreement used monthly advance AUM fees, a 20-year schedule, replacement restrictions and a disclosed $15M / 5x-fees termination formula. |
| Upexi — former discretionary SOL manager | 1.75% per year of AUM, calculated and paid monthly in advance; separate warrants. | 20-year scheduled term; company non-cause exit required a two-thirds stockholder vote and specified termination economics. GSR later terminated effective Dec. 26, 2025 and arbitration remained active in reviewed 2026 filings. | ||
| Galaxy | Forward Industries — discretionary manager | 0.60% per year of managed account assets plus documented account expenses. | 3-year initial term; successive 1-year renewals unless 90-day non-renewal notice. | Same manager, three distinct fee / currentness states. Forward is a lower-rate three-year control; SUI Group adds a $1M annual minimum, exclusivity and a performance-conditioned ordinary exit; FG Nexus started with higher tiers and a $1M floor, later removed the floor, then exited digital assets without an express public contract-termination statement. |
| SUI Group — discretionary SUI manager | 0.60%–0.80% annual asset-based fee plus $1.0M annual minimum and documented expenses. | 5-year initial term; ordinary company exit after year two requires 90-day notice plus an underperformance determination under objective metrics. Partial exclusivity applies to the treasury sleeve. | ||
| FG Nexus — discretionary ETH manager / later strategy exit | 0.75%–1.25% annual asset-based fee; original $1.0M annual minimum later suspended / eliminated. | 3-year initial term; after that, 90-day ordinary company notice. Issuer later sold all digital assets and exited the business, while reviewed filings did not expressly state that the Galaxy agreement itself terminated. |
Same provider, same issuer, different agreement families
Axe Compute / DNA Holdings Venture
DNA was engaged by the same issuer under two separate contracts. The Strategic Advisor Agreement was a three-year, non-exclusive financial-advisory mandate compensated with five-year warrants to purchase 1,348,906 shares at $11.6265. The Asset Management Agreement was a ten-year discretionary mandate with a 1.00% annual asset-based fee plus 25% of profits above 7%.
The exit mechanics also diverge. The adviser agreement uses cause or mutual written termination. The manager agreement gives the issuer a cause-based path while DNA gains a 90-day no-cause termination right after the first anniversary. By June 2026, later disclosure stopped repeating both DNA contracts, creating a currentness gap rather than proof of termination.
The same percentage can hide a different denominator
Hivemind supplies the cleanest cross-client control. AVAX One and Upexi both disclose a 1.25% annual headline rate. But AVAX One pays against Account Size for a discretionary asset-management mandate. Upexi pays against issuer market capitalization for non-discretionary business / operations / capital-markets advice. The latter is paid in common shares and uses ownership-cap and cash-takeout mechanics.
The same AUM rate can still have different total economics
GSR supplies a second control. Lite Strategy and Upexi both disclose 1.75% asset-based manager economics, but the rest of the stack differs materially. Lite Strategy's fee is equity-settled, accompanied by separate GSR warrants, embedded in a 10-year exclusive LTC mandate and tied to a present-value remaining-term exit formula. Upexi's former GSR mandate ran on a 20-year schedule, used separate warrants and contained a different voting, replacement and termination-fee structure before ending in a dispute.
Currentness can diverge across one provider's clients
Galaxy shows why currentness belongs beside price. Forward's 0.60% manager agreement remained economically live in 2026 while a separate Galaxy services contract expired. SUI Group's Galaxy mandate remained active with operating evidence and a $1M minimum. FG Nexus, meanwhile, removed its fee floor and then exited the digital-asset business; the issuer's zero-crypto status did not by itself establish formal contract termination.
Fields to freeze in a provider benchmark
- Agreement family and actual role
- Decision authority and custody / transaction boundary
- Fee denominator and measurement date
- Cash versus shares / warrants / pre-funded warrants
- Minimum fee, incentive fee and reimbursable expenses
- Initial term and renewal mechanics
- Issuer-side and provider-side exit rights
- Remaining-term, cash-takeout or liquidated-damages mechanics
- Exclusivity, replacement and governance rights
- Latest observed accrual / payment / fee-floor change
- Strategy status, funded-asset status and contract status as separate fields
What this does — and does not — establish
These controls establish that public DAT provider economics can vary materially across clients and across contract families even when the provider is the same. They do not establish that any rate or contract is fair, unfair, lawful, unlawful or appropriate for another company, and they do not imply that a provider should be selected, retained or terminated.
Related research
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