Observed outcomes · public sources

What happened after the provider contracts were signed.

Headline fee comparisons are only one layer. Public DAT arrangements already show materially different realized outcomes: compensation resets, internalization, negotiated exits, settlement consideration, litigation and narrower replacement structures.

CaseStarting structureObserved outcomeWhy it mattersSource / case note
Forward / Galaxy
fee reduction
Related-party services agreement at about $583k per month.Monthly fee reduced to $100k in March 2026; agreement then expired June 10.DAT-adjacent provider economics can be renegotiated sharply before expiry.June 2026 10-Q
USBC / Hyrcanian
fee architecture reset
1% asset-based management fee plus 25% performance fee.Amended agreement eliminated the asset fee and moved to a 33% performance-only structure with high-water-mark, reconciliation and clawback mechanics; manager remained active in 2026 filings.Same provider, radically different compensation architecture: amendments must be versioned rather than treated as a static fee field.USBC case note →
SharpLink / Galaxy + ParaFi
internalization
Two external discretionary ETH managers with tiered asset-based fees and annual minimums.Both agreements mutually terminated without termination fees after internal capability was added; Galaxy later returned in a narrower fund structure.Internalization can be a real alternative, and provider re-use can occur under a different mandate.SharpLink case note →
CleanCore / DOGE providers
exit + controls
2% aggregate manager economics plus a separate strategic-advisor agreement.Provider unwind included 70M DOGE and separate cash/equity termination consideration; later disclosures included a restatement, material weakness and added termination / transfer controls.Exit execution can create accounting and reconciliation risk as well as contract cost.CleanCore case note →
Forum Markets / Electric Treasury Edge
negotiated exit
2% annual asset-based fee, $2M annual minimum and contractual early-exit economics.Agreement terminated May 29, 2026; company paid $1.5M in June for outstanding fees/expenses plus an agreed portion of contractual liquidated damages.Termination formula and settlement mechanics belong in the peer record, not just the management-fee column.June 2026 10-Q
CEA Industries / 10X
renegotiation → litigation
1.75% management fee, 20-year structure and material termination economics.Board benchmarked the agreement and proposed 0.50% + up to 0.25% performance compensation, a two-year term and revised exit terms; dispute later moved into litigation.Direct public evidence that DAT agreement benchmarking can feed a live counterproposal and dispute.CEA / 10X case note →
BNB Plus / Cypress
settlement
Related-party package included 1.25% AUM + 10% net-return management economics, a separate $60k/month adviser fee and warrants.July 2026 termination / standstill / mutual release provided $1.0M cash plus 200,000 Series B-1 Preferred shares, with a separate default-fee mechanic.Realized settlement consideration can be materially different from a contract’s recurring headline economics.June 2026 10-Q disclosure
BitMine / Ethereum Tower
replacement structure
10-year provider arrangement with continuing-revenue / exit economics.September 2026 mutual termination disclosed no material early-termination penalty and was paired with a successor affiliate agreement at 1.50% of staking rewards.A successful transition can be a useful control against heavy-lock-in cases: exit outcomes are not uniformly punitive.September 2026 8-K

Product implication

A DAT Provider Economics Stress Test should track the full lifecycle: ENTRY ECONOMICS → CURRENTNESS → AMENDMENTS → EXIT ECONOMICS → REALIZED OUTCOME → TRANSITION CONTROLS. A fee-only report can miss the most consequential part of the relationship.

Illustrative public outcomes, not a complete market census. No legal, fairness, fiduciary, accounting or investment opinion.

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