Observed outcomes · public sources
What happened after the provider contracts were signed.
Headline fee comparisons are only one layer. Public DAT arrangements already show materially different realized outcomes: compensation resets, fee pauses, waivers, non-renewals, unpaid accruals, internalization, negotiated exits, settlement consideration, litigation and narrower replacement structures.
| Case | Starting structure | Observed outcome | Why it matters | Source / case note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nuvve / DeFi Technologies strategy abandoned + contract-status gap | 10-year HYPE manager agreement. First year: four quarterly installments, each max($150k, 1.50% of Account Assets); thereafter 0.50% of Account Assets per quarter. Company no-cause exit uses a 5x prior-year-fees / $1M floor formula; HYPE-strategy abandonment is separately named in the Client-Cause definition. | By November 2025 Nuvve said it had never implemented the announced digital-asset strategy, held no cryptocurrency and would no longer pursue the HYPE strategy. Later filings reviewed do not clearly state whether the AMA was formally terminated or whether its termination mechanics were invoked. | A strategy can disappear before public contract currentness is resolved. Signed mandate, funded assets, business strategy and formal termination status need separate fields. | Nuvve / DeFi case note → |
| Solmate / Pulsar Group fee pause → mutual termination | Separate GCC advisory-services layer at $250k per month, exclusive for the covered services in the GCC, with a two-year initial term. It sits beside Solmate's separate Strategic Advisor Agreement and is not a discretionary treasury-manager fee. | On Apr. 24, 2026 the parties suspended both payment and accrual of the $250k monthly fee while leaving the agreement otherwise in force. They later executed a termination notice on July 29 and mutually terminated the agreement effective that day without further cost or obligation to either party. | Provider state is a sequence, not a static label. ACTIVE — FEE PAUSED was correct after the April filing, but became stale after the July termination event. Later primary-source checks must supersede earlier currentness states. | Solmate provider-stack case note → |
| AI Financial / ALT5 Sigma / Kraken 30-day mandate → not renewed | Kraken was announced as treasury asset manager and then entered into a discretionary cryptocurrency Asset Management Agreement with a 30-day term, renewable only by mutual consent, for a nominal undisclosed fee. | Later annual and quarterly SEC filings state that the Kraken agreement was not renewed. The treasury program continued. In July 2026 a separate two-year Concrete Network Services agreement added vault-infrastructure and deployment mechanics over a defined $100M WLFI token pool, but not as a like-for-like disclosed replacement discretionary manager. | Launch announcement, executed term, renewal status, strategy status and later service-provider role are separate fields. A provider can simply roll off while the treasury remains active and a role-distinct service layer appears later. | AI Financial / Kraken + Concrete case note → |
| Hyperliquid Strategies / Rorschach Advisors future-compensation waiver · agreement active | Five-year strategic-adviser agreement. Qualifying equity / equity-linked financing originally carried a future-grant formula of shares equal to 5% of the financing share count plus warrants equal to 15%; separate Advisor Rights Agreement adds conditional Board nomination and information rights. | By the Aug. 27, 2026 Form 10-K, Rorschach Advisors had waived the additional future-financing grant right unless and until it revokes the waiver for future financings. Revocation requires two weeks' advance notice, and the issuer said no such notice had been provided through the filing / financial-statement issuance date. | A compensation provision can remain contractually present while its exercise is waived. Contract formula, waiver status, revocation mechanics and as-of date should be stored separately from initial transaction shares / warrants and governance rights. | Hyperliquid Strategies / Rorschach case note → |
| TON Strategy / Kingsway payment stop → termination | Related-party advisory agreement with a 2% annual fee on fully diluted issuer market capitalization, $3.0M setup fee and 20-year initial term. | Company stopped monthly payments in March 2026, attempted settlement negotiations, then terminated without settlement on Aug. 10; both sides reserved rights and the company said the financial impact could not yet be estimated. | A DAT provider exit can become a payment-status and unresolved-liability problem before the contract is formally terminated; market-cap denominators also require separate normalization from AUM fees. | TON Strategy / Kingsway case note → |
| Forward / Galaxy Services Agreement separate service-layer fee reduction | Related-party operational / financial / human-resources Services Agreement with Galaxy Digital LP at about $583k per month. This was separate from the 0.60% AUM Asset Management Agreement with Galaxy Digital Capital Management LP. | The Services Agreement monthly fee was reduced to $100k in March 2026, extended through June 10 and then expired according to its terms. The separate 0.60% discretionary Asset Management Agreement remained disclosed in the same June 2026 filing. | Agreement-family separation matters: a service-layer fee reset must not be misread as a renegotiation of the asset-manager's 0.60% AUM fee. | Forward / Galaxy agreement-family case note → |
| USBC / Hyrcanian fee architecture reset | 1% asset-based management fee plus 25% performance fee. | Amended agreement eliminated the asset fee and moved to a 33% performance-only structure with high-water-mark, reconciliation and clawback mechanics; manager remained active in 2026 filings. | Same provider, radically different compensation architecture: amendments must be versioned rather than treated as a static fee field. | USBC case note → |
| SharpLink / Galaxy + ParaFi internalization | Two external discretionary ETH managers with tiered asset-based fees and annual minimums. | Both agreements mutually terminated without termination fees after internal capability was added; Galaxy later returned in a narrower fund structure. | Internalization can be a real alternative, and provider re-use can occur under a different mandate. | SharpLink case note → |
| FG Nexus / Galaxy strategy exit + contract-status gap | Discretionary ETH manager with tiered 0.75%–1.25% asset-based economics and an original $1.0M annual minimum; later filings disclosed that the minimum was waived / eliminated beginning Dec. 1, 2025. | In June 2026 the Board authorized an exit from the digital-asset business; all crypto assets were sold before June 30 and the segment became discontinued operations. The later 10-Q did not expressly say that the Galaxy agreement itself had been terminated. | Business-strategy exit, funded-asset status and legal contract status are different currentness fields. Zero crypto holdings should not be used as a shortcut for contract termination. | FG Nexus / Galaxy case note → |
| CleanCore / DOGE providers exit + transfer-control failure | Aggregate asset-manager economics began at 2% on the first $1B of Treasury Account value, with lower tiers above that level; a separate strategic-advisor agreement had its own recurring compensation. | The asset-management agreements were terminated in February 2026 and the company transferred 70,000,000 DOGE in relation to that termination. The separate strategic-advisor termination involved $5.0M cash plus 3,800,000 common shares. The 70M-DOGE transfer was later restated because it had not been recorded in the accounting system or verified against an independent source during reconciliation, leading to a disclosed material weakness. | Realized exit consideration and transfer controls belong in the same decision record. Provider unwind can create accounting / reconciliation consequences in addition to contract cost. | CleanCore case note → |
| Forum Markets / Electric Treasury Edge negotiated exit | 2% annual asset-based fee, $2M annual minimum, five-year term and an 85% remaining-compensation liquidated-damages clause for specified early company termination. | Agreement terminated May 29, 2026; company paid $1.5M in June for outstanding fees/expenses plus an agreed portion of contractual liquidated damages. | The contract formula and realized settlement are separate fields: original exposure may differ sharply from the amount ultimately negotiated and paid. | Forum / Electric Treasury Edge case note → |
| CEA Industries / 10X benchmark → non-payment → litigation | Long-duration AMA. March 2026 Board disclosure referenced 1.75% of treasury NAV and a 20-year term. | By Sep. 11, 2026 the latest 10-Q described the live fee as 1.4% through 2045, disclosed $1.1M of quarterly expense and $1.4M of accrued unpaid fees, and said invoices had not been paid since Apr. 10 while litigation remained pending. | Direct evidence that a DAT fee benchmark can become a live currentness, accrued-liability, exit and litigation problem; historical fee figures can become stale while the agreement remains active. | CEA / 10X current case note → |
| BNB Plus / Cypress settlement + internalization | Related-party stack: 1.25% annual AUM fee + 10% incentive fee, separate $60k/month adviser fee and 1,986,634 warrants. | July 2026 settlement terminated the manager, adviser and consulting agreements; company agreed to $1.0M cash + 200,000 Series B-1 Preferred shares, with a separate default-fee mechanic, warrant rescission/modification and a transition to fully in-house BNB strategy execution. | Realized exit economics can combine cash, preferred equity, warrant changes, governance separation and internalization rather than mirror the original recurring fee schedule. | BNB Plus / Cypress case note → |
| AlphaTON / DWF financing-linked settlement | TON treasury-management mandate combined provider-supplied financing capital, a planned scale-up in managed assets, restricted-share compensation and investor repurchase / conversion rights. | Only the initial $15M provider contribution had been placed under management before a December 2025 settlement. AlphaTON repurchased the relevant securities, removed vesting restrictions on the provider shares, paid $35k and obtained a mutual release; the TMA was terminated. | Provider economics can be inseparable from the financing transaction that launched the treasury strategy. | AlphaTON / DWF case note → |
| BitMine / Ethereum Tower agreement-family replacement | March 2026 staking MSA: 10-year term, revenue participation and contractual early-exit economics. This was separate from BitMine's July 2025 ETH Treasury Consulting Agreement. | The staking MSA was mutually terminated effective September 3, 2026 with no material early-termination penalty disclosed. A successor agreement with American Validator, an Ethereum Tower affiliate, began September 4 at 1.50% of staking rewards. | A provider transition can replace one agreement family while a different contract with the same provider group remains a separate currentness question. | BitMine case note → |
Product implication
A DAT Provider Economics Stress Test should track the full lifecycle: ENTRY ECONOMICS → CONTRACT CURRENTNESS → FUNDED-ASSET STATUS → STRATEGY STATUS → AMENDMENTS → FEE / COMPENSATION STATUS (EFFECTIVE-NOT-YET-OBSERVED / ACTIVE / PAUSED / WAIVED / REVOCABLE-WAIVER / ACCRUING-UNPAID) → RENEWAL / NON-RENEWAL → EXIT ECONOMICS → REALIZED OUTCOME → TRANSITION CONTROLS. A fee-only report can miss the most consequential part of the relationship.
Illustrative public outcomes, not a complete market census. No legal, fairness, fiduciary, accounting or investment opinion.
Board / CFO review path